© 2001 by Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies
Al-Ghazzali's Tahafut: Is it really a rejection of Ibn Sina's Philosophy?
De Wulf-Mansioncentrum, Leuven
It is well-known that al-Ghazzali, in different works, used a lot of Avicennian sources. Therefore, one might expect that his Tahafut is fundamentally directed against Ibn Sina's philosophy, especially since the Maqasid, a work apparently written as an introduction to the Tahafut, is very largely dependent upon the latter's Danesh-Nameh. This paper offers a detailed and critical analysis of al-Ghazzali's explicit statements about the intentions of the Tahafut, as presented in its ‘religious preface’, four introductions and final conclusion. From that analysis, it becomes clear that al-Ghazzali is particularly targeting the philosophers who believe themselves to be possessed of superior knowledge and who follow blindly the ancient philosophers. We observe that Ibn Sina is a somewhat atypical philosopher on both counts: he seems to recognize that not all matters can be proven demonstratively, and he is anything but a slavish follower of Aristotle. Therefore, it is not evident that he constitutes the primary target of the Tahafut. A survey of the sources of the Tahafut leads to the same conclusion. Although al-Ghazzali uses mainly Avicennian texts, it is very far from obvious that al-Ghazzali radically rejected Ibn Sina's philosophy. Hence, the paper concludes that whether the Tahafut was essentially anti-Avicennian must be regarded as an open question.
* This paper is based on a lecture which I had the honour to give in Oxford at the Centre for Islamic Studies on March 1, 2000. I wish to express my sincere thanks to the Director of the Centre for his warm welcome, as well as to my friend Y. Michot for his kind invitation.