© 2001 by Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies
Ibn Sina’s ‘Burhan Al-Siddiqin’
Institute of Ismaili Studies, London
Ibn Sina (d.429/1037) gave a distinctive argument for the existence of God in his works. Scholars disagree on the exact structure and character of his argument (admittedly, Ibn Sina gives it in more than one form). This paper tries to determine the argument's precise shape and classify it in relation to other such proofs. It attempts this through a detailed analysis of one of the best known presentations of the proof, in Ibn Sina's Isharat, which is cross-checked with other versions and the commentaries. The argument is found to build on the proposition that existence occurs in the mind dichotomically, as either necessary or contingent. Ibn Sina claims that an extramental Necessary Existent follows from both modes. In the first case, it is contradictory to posit ‘necessary existence’ in the mind and deny it outside the mind. In the second case ‘contingent existence’ is such that it could not be self-explanatory. Most space in Ibn Sina's argument is taken up with showing that contingent existence, even if temporally infinite, ultimately implies necessary existence. On these grounds, it is concluded that Ibn Sina's proof must be classified as both ontological and cosmological, without paradox. It is ontological insofar as ‘necessary existence’ in intellect is the first basis for arguing for a Necessary Existent in re. It is, however, also cosmological insofar as most of it is taken up with arguing that contingent existents cannot stand alone and must end up in a Necessary Existent.
* Author's note: My thanks to Tony Street, Yahya Michot and Sajjad Rizvi.